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STANDARD TO STAND TRIAL
Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Godinez v. Moran,' the United States Supreme Court held that
due process does not require a higher competency standard for
pleading guilty or waiving the right to an attorney than the standard
for competency to stand trial. The Court first concluded that the
decision to plead guilty is no more difficult than the sum total of the
many decisions required of a defendant who pleads not guilty dur-
ing the course of a trial.2 The Court then concluded that the deci-
sion to waive counsel requires a mental capacity no higher than that
required in the decision to waive the constitutional rights that a de-
fendant forgoes when he elects to plead guilty.3
This Note argues that the Court correctly ruled that due pro-
cess does not require a higher competency standard to waive consti-
tutional rights than the competency standard to stand trial. This
Note first argues that the Court properly declined to interpret ear-
lier Supreme Court precedent, most notably Westbrook v. Arizona,4 as
compelling a defendant to show greater mental capacity to be
deemed capable to waive constitutional rights than that capacity re-
quired to enable a defendant to stand trial. Second, this Note dem-
onstrates that the Court's opinion is consistent with the advantages
of, and policy justifications behind, the plea bargaining process.
Third, this Note illustrates that the Court's decision is consistent
with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, as
1 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
2 Id. at 2686.
3 Id
4 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam).
883
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
recognized in Faretta v. California.5 Finally, this Note examines the
implications the Godinez opinion holds for future defendants' collat-
eral challenges based on their alleged incompetency to have waived
their constitutional rights.
II. BACKGROUND
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law. ' 6 This clause guarantees "the
fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial" to defendants
in state courts. 7 This guarantee of fundamental fairness requires
that a defendant, in order to be subjected to any criminal proceed-
ings, possess a satisfactory level of mental capacity to understand
and comprehend the proceedings.8 Once the trial court is con-
vinced that the defendant satisfies this requisite level of competency,
the defendant may be put to trial. This guarantee of fundamental
fairness during criminal proceedings additionally incorporates those
procedural safeguards enumerated in the Bill of Rights that are "es-
sential to a fair trial." 9 Included in these safeguards are the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination and
the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.10 Never-
theless, such constitutional rights may be waived by a defendant
who is mentally competent to do so." Until Godinez, the Supreme
Court had never resolved a split in the federal circuits as to whether
due process requires a competency standard to waive such constitu-
tional rights that is higher than the competency standard to stand
trial.
A. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
Courts have long recognized that due process "prohibits the
criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand
5 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
7 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967).
8 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). See infra notes 12-28
and accompanying text.
9 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
10 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1964) (prohibition against compulsory self-
incrimination); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-44 (right to counsel).




trial." 12 Generally, due process requires that a defendant, in order
to undergo legal proceedings, "have the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with
counsel, and to assist in the preparation of his defense."13 Trial
courts have an affirmative duty to conduct an inquiry into a defend-
ant's mental competency when, at any point in the proceedings, any
"evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's competence
to stand trial."' 14 Although a defendant's state of mental compe-
tency is difficult to assess and quantify, 15 in Dusky v. United States,16
the United States Supreme Court enunciated a legal standard gov-
erning the minimum competency required of defendants before
they may be put to trial. The Dusky Court held that "the test must
be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
12 Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2574 (1992). Accord Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 171-73 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
This principle is deeply rooted in common law and was recognized by Blackstone.
Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2578; Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1963);
Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940-46 (6th Cir. 1899). To support his contention
that a mentally disturbed defendant should not be tried, Blackstone argued:
If a man in his sound memory commits an offence, and before arraignment for it, he
becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to
it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the
prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how can he make his defence?
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24. Another commentator from Blackstone's
era, agreeing that a defendant of unsound mind should not be tried for a criminal of-
fense, explained that:
[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before his arraign-
ment he becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be arraigned during such
his phrenzy, but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed; the reason
is, because he cannot advisedly plead to the indictment .... And if such person
after his plea, and before his trial, becomes of non sane memory, he shall not be tried;
or, if after his trial he becomes of non sane memory, he shall not receive judgment; or,
if after judgment he becomes of non sane memory, his execution shall be spared; for
were he of sound memory, he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or
execution.
1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE *34-*35 (1736) (citations omitted).
13 Drope, 420 U.S. at 17 1. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (1985) ("No person who
as a result of mental illness or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings
against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the
commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.").
14 Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86 (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule is codified
in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (1985), which provides:
[The court shall ... order such a hearing on its own motion [to determine the
mental competency of the defendant] if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.
(emphasis added).
15 See THOMAS GRIsso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 69-70 (1986) (listing commenta-
tors' criticisms of the substance of psychiatric competency assessments and the proce-
dures with which they are performed).
16 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him."' 7 This test has its origins in Youtsey v. United States,' in
which the Sixth Circuit reversed a defendant's conviction because
the district court never determined whether the defendant's epi-
lepsy had rendered him "incapable of understanding the proceed-
ings, and intelligently advising with his counsel as to his defense."' 9
Courts and commentators have identified two main policies
supporting the notion that due process prohibits the trial of incom-
petent defendants. First, the prohibition against the trial of incom-
petent defendants is "fundamental to an adversary system of
justice."'20 Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent to
stand trial reflects the concern for the accuracy and fairness of crimi-
nal judicial proceedings. 2' A defendant who is not of a rational and
sound mind may unintentionally fail to provide important informa-
tion that might tend to reveal his innocence.2 2 Moreover, a mentally
deficient defendant may be unable to make basic decisions through-
out the proceedings, such as how to plead and whether to dismiss
counsel, 23 or an incompetent defendant may conduct himself in an
irrational and inappropriate manner that disturbs the proceed-
17 Id. Dusky is codified generally at 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (1988), which provides:
If, after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him men-
tally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense,
the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General. The
Attorney General shall [then] hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable
facility ....
18 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).
19 Id. at 946-47. Similarly, in United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284 (S.D. Ala. 1906), a
district court held that:
[A] person, though not entirely sane, may be put upon trial in a criminal case if he
rightly comprehends his own condition with reference to the proceedings, and has
such possession and control of his mental powers, including the faculty of memory,
as will enable him to testify intelligently and give his counsel all the material facts
... , and has such poise of his faculties as will enable him to rationally and properly
exercise all the rights which the law gives him in contesting a conviction.
Id. at 287. See also McIntosh v. Pescor, 175 F.2d 95, 98-99 (6th Cir. 1949) (issue was
"whether the accused had the mental capacity to understand the proceedings against
him and rationally advise with his counsel as to his defense").
See Peter R. Silten & Richard Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1058-65 (1977), for a more in-depth analysis of the evolution and
application of the Dusky standard.
20 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) (citing Note, Incompetency to Stand
Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 457-59 (1967)); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 commentary at
220 n.1 (1985).
21 Note, supra note 20, at 457.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 458.
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ings.24 Also, the traditional justifications for criminal punishment-
such as retribution and specific deterrence-require that a defend-
ant understand why he is being punished. 25 Such understanding
may be lost when a defendant cannot rationally comprehend the
proceedings. 2
6
Second, the prohibition against the trial of incompetent defend-
ants is a derivative of the prohibition against trials in absentia.27 A
defendant of unsound mind, although present in body during the
trial, may be absent from the trial as he is mentally incapable of
presenting, comprehending, and participating in his defense. 28
B. THE RIGHT TO WAIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee several rights to a
defendant during a criminal trial. Included are the prohibition of
compulsory self-incrimination, 29 the right to a jury trial,30 the right
to confront one's accusers,3' and the right to assistance of coun-
sel.5 2 But even though these rights are guaranteed to all, a defend-
ant may waive them.
For instance, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused in
criminal prosecutions the right "to have the assistance of counsel
for his defence."33 This right to assistance of counsel is a funda-
mental right.3 4 Therefore, when an indigent defendant cannot af-
ford an attorney, the judicial system is obligated to provide that
defendant with legal representation.3 5 The assistance of counsel is
24 Id
25 Id at 458-59.
26 Id
27 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting Caleb Foote, A Comment on
Pre-Trial Commitments of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960)); Silten &
Tullis, supra note 19, at 1053.
28 Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (quoting Foote, supra note 27, at 834).
29 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.




34 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
35 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1972)
(an indigent's right to assistance of counsel extends to any criminal trial where an ac-
cused faces imprisonment, regardless of whether the offense is classified as felony, mis-
demeanor, or petty). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369, 373-74 (1979) (an
indigent's right to assistance of counsel does not extend to those trials for which impris-
onment is authorized, but not actually imposed, on a defendant, nor does it extend to
those trials in which fines are actually imposed).
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deemed necessary because the complex procedural and substantive
safeguards in the law, which ensure fair trials, cannot be effective if
the defendant is forced to stand trial without a defense counsel who
has been educated to use them appropriately. 36
A defendant may waive the right to counsel, however. In Faretta
v. California,3 7 the Supreme Court recognized that the fundamental
right to assistance of counsel does not imply that a state may consti-
tutionally force an unwilling defendant to accept representation that
he does not want. 38 Rather, the Faretta Court inferred a right of self-
representation from the structure of the Sixth Amendment.39 Ac-
cording to the Court, "[i]t is the accused, not counsel, who must be
'informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,' who must be
'confronted with the witnesses against him,' and who must be ac-
corded 'compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' "40
The right to defend oneself, the Court noted, "is given directly to
the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense
fails." 41 Since the Sixth Amendment speaks of the assistance of coun-
sel, an attorney, however expert and versed in the intricacies of the
law, is merely an assistant to a criminal defendant. 42 To force repre-
sentation on an unwilling defendant would transform counsel from
the defendant's mere assistant to his master.43 The fact that a de-
fendant would likely present a more effective defense with the assist-
ance of counsel does not matter since a defendant's technical legal
knowledge is irrelevant "to an assessment of his knowing exercise of
the right to defend himself."'44
Likewise, the Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person
shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."45 The Supreme Court, in holding the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, has stated that "the privilege is one of the
principles of a free government." 46 However, the Fifth Amendment
does not imply that a defendant may never testify against himself; it
36 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. See also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 11.1(a), at 7 (1984).
37 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
38 Id. at 833-34.
39 Id. at 819-20.
40 Id. at 819 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI.).
41 Id. at 819-20.
42 Id. at 820.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 836.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. V.




merely guarantees that a defendant cannot be forced to do so.47 A
defendant will generally testify against himself after striking a plea
bargain deal with the prosecution, whereby the accused usually
agrees to plead "guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of
the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sen-
tence than that possible for the graver charge." 48 But by pleading
guilty, not only does a defendant waive the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination; that defendant also simultaneously
waives several other constitutional rights, including the right to trial
by jury and the right to confront one's accusers. 49
Until Santobello v. New York, 50 the constitutionality of plea bar-
gaining arrangements was uncertain. The Santobello Court, in recog-
nizing a defendant's right to plea bargain,5 1 noted that plea
bargaining is an "essential component of the administration ofjus-
tice" that mutually benefits both the defendant and the state prose-
cution.52 According to the Court, if every defendant were subjected
to a criminal trial, "the States and Federal Government would need
to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facili-
ties." s53 For the accused defendant, plea bargaining "avoids much
of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial con-
finement for those who are denied release pending trial," 54 reduces
the public exposure and scrutiny a defendant must face while under-
going trial, 55 eliminates the practical burdens-both emotional and
financial-for an accused in defending himself,5 6 accelerates the in-
evitable conviction and correctional process of a defendant facing
overwhelming evidence, 57 and enhances the rehabilitative potential
of the imprisonment system "by shortening the time between
charge and disposition. ' 5 8
When a mentally competent defendant wishes to waive such
47 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), discussed infra notes 50-58 and
accompanying text.
48 BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1152 (6th ed. 1990).
49 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
50 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
51 The right of a defendant to plea bargain is now codified in FED. R. GRIM. P.
11(a)(1) ("A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere."). Neverthe-
less, "[a] court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion." Santobello, 404
U.S. at 261; FED. R. GRIM. P. ll(e)(4).
52 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
53 Il
54 Id. at 261.
55 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
56 Id
57 Id.
58 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
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constitutional rights, the trial court must make a detailed inquiry
into whether that waiver is valid. The Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence, which has concentrated primarily on the right to counsel and
the prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, has set a high
standard for a valid waiver of such constitutional guarantees. The
Court has articulated three requirements of a waiver of such rights
that must be met before the waiver may be accepted as valid:59 the
defendant's waiver must be voluntary, 60 it must be "intelligent and
knowing," 6 1 and the trial court record must demonstrate that the
accused waived such rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli-
gently.62 This test applies to the waiver of many rights, including
those of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The fundamental nature
of the constitutional right to counsel imposes the serious protective
duty on the trial court to determine whether a defendant's discharge
of counsel is valid. 63 Similarly, a plea of guilty is considered a
"grave and solemn" act because the defendant admits to having
committed the acts of which he is accused and agrees to a conviction
without a trial. 64 Accordingly, a petitioner who is incompetent to
enter an intelligent plea may either withdraw the guilty plea65 or
collaterally attack the sentence or conviction.
66
C. THE DISPUTE OVER THE REQUISITE STANDARD FOR COMPETENCY
TO WAIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Although the Supreme Court has articulated standards to de-
termine whether a defendant's waiver of constitutional rights is
valid, 67 the Court had never defined the standard of mental compe-
tency by which a defendant is deemed capable to voluntarily and
intelligently waive those rights until Godinez.68 The tests for the va-
59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c) and (d) codify these requirements, which must be satisfied
before the judge may accept a guilty plea.
60 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463-64 (1938) (waiver of counsel); Brady, 397
U.S. at 748 (guilty plea).
61 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (waiver of counsel); Brady, 397 U.S.
at 748 (guilty plea).
62 Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (waiver of counsel); Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (guilty plea).
63 Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam) (citingJohnson, 304 U.S.
at 465).
64 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
65 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) ("[To correct manifest injustice the court after sentence
may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his
plea.").
66 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988); United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
67 See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
68 Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2685 (1993).
890 [Vol. 84
COMPETENCY STANDARDS
lidity of a waiver of constitutional rights assume that the defendant
is competent to make a rational choice among various courses of
action.69 Before Godinez, Supreme Court jurisprudence was less
than clear as to the degree of mental competency required before a
defendant may make the decision to waive such constitutional
rights. 7
0
In Massey v. Moore,7 1 the Court first acknowledged that the stan-
dard of competency required to stand trial without a lawyer might be
higher than the standard required to stand trial with an advocate. 72
In Massey, the defendant repeatedly attempted to obtain habeas
corpus relief in both federal and state courts, claiming that he had
been unconstitutionally tried and convicted without benefit of coun-
sel while insane. 73 The defendant was unsuccessful in each applica-
tion because the court records falsely noted that he had been
represented by an attorney.74 When it learned of the error, the dis-
trict court ruled, without stating any basis or reasoning for its deci-
sion, that the defendant's claim was without merit. 75
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court opin-
ion was legally ambiguous since it did not clarify the basis of its find-
ing and, hence, that the question of Massey's "ability to represent
himself without counsel remain[ed] undetermined." 76 According to
the Court in Massey, the district court ruling could be interpreted in
two ways. First, it could mean that the particular evidence that sup-
ported the finding that Massey was competent to stand trial with
counsel also sufficiently supported the independent conclusion that
Massey was competent to stand trial without counsel. 77 Alterna-
tively, the ruling could have meant that the issues of competency to
stand trial with or without counsel required the same inquiry, with
the evidence supporting a conclusion of competence to stand trial
assisted by an attorney necessarily supporting a conclusion of com-
petency to stand trial without representation. 78 Acknowledging that
69 See George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More Careful Analysis, 55
TEx. L. REv. 193, 260 (1977).
70 Although a defendant could presumably waive any procedural protection guaran-
teed by the Constitution, most cases have involved waivers of the Fifth Amendment right
against compulsory self-incrimination through the entry of a guilty plea and the Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel.
71 348 U.S. 105 (1954).
72 Id- at 108.
73 Id. at 106.
74 Id. at 107.
75 Id. at 107-08.





the issue of whether the requisite competency standard to stand trial
without an attorney was higher than the standard to stand trial with
an attorney was yet unsettled, the Massey Court noted that "[o]ne
might not be insane in the sense of being incapable of standing trial
and yet lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit of counsel. 79
In Rees v. Peyton,80 the Court addressed the issue of a defend-
ant's competency to waive the right to appellate review. In Rees, a
capital defendant wanted to withdraw his petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court and forego further legal proceedings.8 1 Rees'
counsel advised the Court that he could not honor Rees' instruc-
tions without a psychiatric investigation since evidence indicated
that Rees might not be mentally capable of making such a deci-
sion.82 A psychiatrist selected by Rees' counsel examined Rees and
filed a detailed report concluding that Rees was mentally incompe-
tent.83 State-selected psychiatrists, however, subsequently doubted
that finding of insanity.8 4 As the district court had not made a fac-
tual determination as to Rees' mental condition in light of his desire
to cease appealing his conviction,8 5 the Rees Court could not deter-
mine how to dispose of his petition.8 6 Accordingly, the Court di-
rected the district court to make the initial judicial determination
into whether the defendant possessed the "capacity to appreciate
his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or
abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is
suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may sub-
stantially affect his capacity in the premises."87
The federal circuit courts that confronted this issue disagreed
on whether the competency standard to waive counsel or plead
guilty88 is higher than, or equivalent to, the Dusky standard for
standing trial. This conflict occurred due to different readings of
the Supreme Court's holding in Westbrook v. Arizona.89 In Westbrook,
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder after discharging
79 Id. (emphasis added).
80 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam).




85 Id. at 313-14.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
88 As noted, a defendant could presumably waive any procedural protection guaran-
teed by the Constitution, but most cases have specifically concerned either the waiver of
the right to counsel or the prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination. See supra
note 70.
89 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam).
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his counsel and conducting his own defense. 90 The trial court con-
ducted a hearing regarding his competence to stand trial, but not
his competence to waive his right to counsel and to conduct his own
defense. 91 Noting that the fundamental nature of the right to coun-
sel places a protective duty on the court to determine whether the
accused waived this right intelligently and competently, 92 the Court,
with no discussion of the actual trial record, remanded the case for
further proceedings to determine whether these protecting duties,
enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst 93 and Carnley v. Cochran,9 4 had been
fulfilled.9
5
The Ninth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit employed a
heightened standard for evaluating a defendant's competency to
enter a guilty plea. In Siding v. Eyman,96 the Ninth Circuit inferred
from Westbrook that a determination of competency to stand trial is
inadequate to evaluate competency to plead guilty. 97 In Sieling, a
convict, who had pleaded guilty at trial, petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus on the theory that his mental incompetence invali-
dated his guilty pleas.98 Although originally found competent to
stand trial, the defendant argued that because his competency to
plead guilty had not been raised, the trial court never ruled on the
issue. 99 The Sieling court agreed with this argument, citing the fact
that the Westbrook Court had remanded the case for "further inquiry
into the issue of [the defendant's] competence to waive his constitu-
tional right to the assistance of counsel" after the state court had
concluded that the defendant was mentally competent to stand
trial.100 The Sieling court reasoned from this that a determination of
competency to stand trial is inadequate to imply competency to
plead guilty because it does not measure a defendant's mental ca-
pacity by a high enough standard. 1 1 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that although Westbrook did not enunciate a specific standard, it was
90 State v. Westbrook, 406 P.2d 388, 390 (Ariz. 1965).
91 Westbrook, 384 U.S. at 150.
92 Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506 (1962)).
93 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
94 369 U.S. 506 (1962). See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
95 Westbrook, 384 U.S. at 151.
96 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973). Because the court reached the same conclusion as
Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1992), which was reversed by Godinez v. Moran,
113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993), the Siding decision has been reversed by implication.
97 Id. at 214-15.
98 Id at 213.
99 Id.





reasonable that the standard to waive a constitutional right was that
"degree [of competence] which enables [the defendant] to make de-
cisions of very serious import."10 2 The court then held that a de-
fendant must have the mental capacity to "make a reasoned choice
among the alternatives presented to him and to understand the na-
ture of the consequences of his plea."103 The court believed this
standard to be appropriate because it "requires a court to assess a
defendant's competency with specific reference to the gravity of the
decisions with which the defendant is faced."' 10 4 The District of Co-
lumbia later adopted the Sieling standard, with little actual discus-
sion or explanation, in United States v. Masthers.'0 5
Every other circuit, by contrast, has applied the Dusky standard
to evaluate a defendant's competency to enter a guilty plea. Several
of these circuits rejected the Ninth Circuit's rule requiring a height-
ened standard of mental competency for the entry of a guilty plea,
although each opinion provides little explanation beyond the mere
assertion that there is no logical reason for a conclusion that the
standards should be different. 10 6 The remaining circuits, in cases in
which the applicable legal standard was not in dispute, simply ap-
plied the Dusky standard in evaluating a defendant's competency to
enter a guilty plea.'
0 7
Several circuits have struggled to interpret the Westbrook hold-
ing as it pertains to the competency standard required for a defend-
102 Id. at 215.
103 Id. That standard was first suggested in Scholler v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1194
(9th Cir.) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970).
104 Sieling, 478 F.2d at 215.
105 539 F.2d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355,
362 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("While [defendant's] level of awareness and comprehension
might have been high enough to render him competent to stand trial, it may not have
been high enough to allow him to validly waive his constitutional right to a trial by jury
106 See Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.) (applying Dusky despite the de-
fendant's argument for a higher standard), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978); United
States v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1975) (rejecting Sieling in favor of Dusky
standard); Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 314 (4th Cir.) (adopting a standard "parallel"
to that of Dusky as the court could see "no logical reason that the standards should be
different"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649,
654 (5th Cir. 1974) ("The testis] of mental competency at the time of trial or the enter-
ing of a plea ... (are] the same."); United States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515, 517 (6th Cir.)
(rejecting the argument that the standard to plead guilty should be more stringent), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1006 (1973); United States ex rel. Heral v. Franzen, 667 F.2d 633, 638
(7th Cir. 1981) (agreeing with several other circuits that the standards are equivalent).
107 See United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634, 635 (2d Cir. 1960) (applying the pre-
Dusky formulation for competency articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 4244); Stanley v. Lockhart,
941 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1991); Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443, 444 (10th Cir.




ant to be capable of discharging counsel. The Second, Sixth, and
Eighth Circuits, each applied the Dusky standard in the context of
guilty pleas, but indicated that the competency standard for waiving
the right to counsel is "vaguely higher" than, or "not coextensive"
with, the competency standard for standing trial.'08 The First Cir-
cuit, which also applied Dusky in the context of guilty pleas, noted
that the two standards "may not always be coterminous." 10 9 Only
the Ninth Circuit has applied the Sieling "reasoned choice" standard
to waivers of counsel."10 The Seventh Circuit alone has held that
the competency standards for standing trial and waiving counsel are
identical,"' while the Fourth Circuit noted that the two standards
are "closely linked."" 2 The Supreme Court noted this division in
the circuits and granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the
competency standard to discharge counsel or plead guilty is higher
than the standard to stand trial."
3
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 2, 1984, Richard Allen Moran entered a saloon and
killed the bartender and a patron by shooting each four times." 14
Moran then removed the cash register 51 5 and set fires in several lo-
cations within the saloon."16 Nine days later, he shot and killed his
ex-wife at her apartment, hitting her with five of the seven shots he
fired. 1 7 Moran then shot himself in the abdomen and slit his
108 United States ex rel Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1975)
("[Westbrook] does indicate that the standard of competence for making the decision to
represent oneself is vaguely higher than the standard for competence to stand trial.") (em-
phasis added), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 937 (1976); United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d
245, 250 (6th Cir.) ("We recognize that the degree of competency required to waive
counsel is 'vaguely higher than the competency required to stand trial.' ") (emphasis ad-
ded), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 980 (1987); Blackmon v. Armontrout, 875 F.2d 164, 166 (8th
Cir.) ("The standard for determining whether a person is capable of making a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is not coextensive with the test for determin-
ing competency to proceed to trial.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 939 (1989).
109 United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 846 (1st Cir. 1989).
110 Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2680
(1993).
111 United States v. Clark, 943 F.2d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[N]o additional compe-
tency determination need be made [beyond the determination of competency to stand
trial.]"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3045 (1993).
112 United States v. McGinnis, 384 F.2d 875, 877 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 990 (1968).
113 See Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2684-85 (1993).
114 Id. at 2682.
"15 Id.
116 Moran v. State, 734 P.2d 712, 713 (Nev. 1987) (per curiam).
117 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2682.
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wrists.' 18 On August 13, 1984, while hospitalized for his suicide at-
tempt, he confessed to the murders." 19
Later, after Moran pleaded not guilty to the three charges of
murder in the first degree, the trial court ordered that two psychia-
trists examine his fitness to stand trial. 120 Although these psychia-
trists determined that Moran was "very depressed," felt
"considerable remorse and guilt" for his actions, and "may be in-
clined to exert less effort towards his own defense," they concluded
that he was fit to stand trial since he was "knowledgeable of the
charges being made against him and [could] assist his attorney, in
his own defense, if he so desire[d].' 12 1 The State then announced
that it would seek the death penalty against Moran.
122
Two and one-half months later, on November 28, 1984, Moran
informed the court that he wished to plead guilty and discharge his
attorney so as "to prevent the presentation of any mitigating evi-
dence at his sentencing."' 123 Based solely upon the original psychi-
atric reports submitted two and one-half months earlier, which had
examined Moran's competency to stand trial, the trial court con-
cluded that Moran was competent to plead guilty and discharge his
attorney. 124 Specifically, the court found that Moran knew the na-
ture of the acts he had committed and could determine right from
wrong, that he understood the charges against him and could assist
in his defense, that he recognized the consequences of his guilty
pleas, and that he could intelligently and knowingly waive his right
to be represented by counsel. 125 The trial court then posed a series
of routine questions concerning Moran's understanding of his legal
rights, advised him of his right to legal counsel, "warned him of the
'dangers and disadvantages' of self-representation, inquired into his
understanding of the proceedings .... and asked why he had chosen
to represent himself."' 126 To this inquiry, Moran gave "largely mon-




121 Id. at 2692 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2683 n.1.
122 Id. at 2682-83.




127 Id. at 2693 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The dissent cited the following exchange to
highlight the "mechanical" nature of Moran's answers:
When the trial judge asked him whether he killed his ex-wife "deliberately, with
premeditation and malice aforethought," Moran unexpectedly responded: "No, I
didn't do it-I mean, I wasn't looking to kill her, but she ended up dead." Instead
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of counsel as valid, explicitly finding that he "was 'knowingly and
intelligently' waiving his right to counsel."' 28 After determining
that Moran "was not pleading guilty in response to threats .... that
he understood the nature of the charges . . . and consequences of
pleading guilty, that he was aware of the [constitutional] rights he
was giving up, and that there was a factual basis for the pleas," the
court also accepted Moran's guilty pleas as "freely and voluntarily"
given. 129
The trial court also inquired as to whether Moran was "pres-
ently under the influence of any drug or alcohol," to which Moran
responded, "U]ust what they give me in, you know, medications."'' 30
At the time, Moran was being administered simultaneously four
types of medications-phenobarbital, dilantin, inderal, and vis-
taril.' 3t Later testimony revealed that the drugs had a "numbing
effect" on Moran; he stated that he did not care about the proceed-
ings or anything else that was going on.13 2 The trial court, however,
made no further inquiry or investigation into either the dosages or
the type of medication Moran was taking.1'3
After Moran entered his guilty pleas, he was sentenced to death
for each of the murders by a three judge panel on January 21,
1985.134 The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the death
sentences for the two saloon murders, but reversed the death sen-
of probing further, the trial judge simply repeated the question, inquiring again
whether Moran had acted deliberately. Once again, Moran replied: "I don't know.
I mean, I don't know what you mean by deliberately. I mean, I pulled the trigger on
purpose, but I didn't plan on doing it; you know what I mean?" Ignoring the ambi-
guity of Moran's responses, the trial judge reframed the question to elicit an affirm-
ative answer, stating: "Well, I've previously explained to you what is meant by
deliberation and premeditation. Deliberate means that you arrived at or deter-
mined as a result of careful thought and weighing the consideration for and against
the proposed action. Did you do that?" This time, Moran responded: "Yes."
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
128 Id at 2683.
129 Id.
130 Id at 2692 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131 Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that Moran's medical records
"show that Moran was administered dilantin, an anti-epileptic medication that may cause
confusion; inderal, a beta-blocker anti-arrhythmic that may cause light-headedness,
mental depression, hallucinations, disorientation, and short-term memory loss; and vis-
taril, a depressant that may cause drowsiness, tremors, and convulsions." Id at 2692 n. 1
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Phenobarbital is a central nervous system depressant that is used primarily as a sed-
ative-hypnotic. PHYsICiANs' DESK REFERENCE 1331 (47th ed. 1993). The drug can ac-
centuate emotional disturbances and can cause drowsiness and lethargy. Id. at 1332-33.
132 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2692 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 2683. NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4)(a) (1992) provides, in pertinent part:
Every person convicted of murder of the first degree shall be punished: (a) By
death, only if one or more aggravating circumstances are found and any mitigating
89719941
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
tence for the murder of Moran's ex-wife. 13 5 For that murder, the
Nevada court instead imposed a life sentence and denied the possi-
bility of parole.
3 6
Moran then petitioned the state court for post-conviction re-
lief.' 3 7 The trial court reviewed the evidence and rejected Moran's
argument that his mental incompetence precluded his self-represen-
tation.13 8 The court ruled that "the record clearly show[ed] that he
was examined by two psychiatrists both of whom declared [him]
competent."' 39 The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed Moran's
subsequent appea 1 40 and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 
1 41
Moran subsequently filed for habeas corpus review in the
United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The district
court denied the petition. 14 2 The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating
that the "record in this case should have led the trial court to en-
tertai[n] a good faith doubt about [respondent's] competency to
make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of constitutional
rights." 4 3 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "[d]ue pro-
cess... required the court to hold [an additional] hearing to evalu-
ate . . . Moran's competency to waive [his] constitutional rights
circumstance or circumstances which are found do not outweigh the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances.
135 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2683. Concerning the murder of his ex-wife, the court held
that Moran did not satisfy any of the "aggravating circumstances" and consequently was
ineligible for the death penalty for that particular murder under NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.030(4)(a) (1992). Moran v. State, 734 P.2d 712, 714 (Nev. 1987). NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.033 (1993) provides, in pertinent part:
The only circumstances by which murder of the first degree may be aggravated are:
3. The murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk
of death to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action
which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
8. The murder involved torture, depravity of mind or the mutilation of the
victim.
9. The murder was committed upon one or more persons at random and with-
out apparent motive.
136 Moran, 734 P.2d at 714. NEv. REV. STAT. § 177.055(3)(c) (1992) provides, in per-
tinent part, that "[t]he supreme court, when reviewing a death sentence, may: ... (c) Set
aside the sentence of death and impose the sentence of imprisonment for life without
possibility of parole."
137 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2683.
138 Id.
139 Id. (second alteration in original).
140 Moran v. Warden, 810 P.2d 335 (Nev. 1989).
141 Moran v. Whitley, 493 U.S. 874 (1989).
142 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2683.
143 Id. at 2683-84 (quoting Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 265 (9th Cir. 1992) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993)).
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before it accepted his decision to discharge counsel and [plead
guilty]."
144
The State additionally argued that any possible error by the
trial court at the plea hearing was corrected by the post-conviction
hearing 145 and that the state court's competency hearing was enti-
tled to the deference given state court findings of fact on habeas
review. 146 The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments, stating that
"the state court's postconviction ruling was premised on the wrong
legal standard of competency."' 4 7 "Competency to waive constitu-
tional rights," in the Ninth Circuit's view, "require[d] a higher level
of mental functioning than that required to stand trial."' 48 The
court stated that competency to stand trial requires only that a de-
fendant have "a rational and factual understanding of the proceed-
ings and . . . [be] capable of assisting his counsel," while the
competency to waive counsel or plead guilty requires that a defend-
ant have "the capacity for 'reasoned choice' among the alternatives
available to him."' 49 Furthermore, the court held that "the record
did not support a finding that [Moran] was mentally capable of the
reasoned choice required for a valid waiver of constitutional
rights.150 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court, granting it sixty days within which to issue the habeas writ
unless the state court, in that time, allowed Moran "to withdraw his
guilty pleas, enter new pleas, and proceed to trial with the assistance
of counsel."151
The state petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States, which granted the writ to resolve the
conflict over whether due process requires a higher degree of
mental competence for pleading guilty or waiving the right to an
attorney than that degree of mental competence necessary to stand
144 Moran, 972 F.2d at 265.
145 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2684 (citing Moran, 972 F.2d at 265).
146 Id. (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988)). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides, in
pertinent part:
[Iln any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a
hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competentjurisdiction
in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or
agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other
reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct ....
(emphasis added).
147 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2684 (quoting Moran, 972 F.2d at 266).
148 Id (quoting Moran, 972 F.2d at 266).
149 Id, (quoting Moran, 972 F.2d at 266).
150 Id. (quoting Moran, 972 F.2d at 267).




IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, l5 3 began by noting
that the distinction between the "rational understanding" standard
of Dusky and the Ninth Circuit's "reasoned choice" standard was
"not readily apparent."' 154 Even assuming, arguendo, that a distinc-
tion exists, Justice Thomas held that due process does not require
either a different or a higher competency standard to plead guilty or
waive counsel than that to stand trial.'
5 5
1. The Requisite Competency Standard to Plead Guilty
Justice Thomas approached the competency standards to plead
guilty and waive counsel separately. Examining the standard to
plead guilty, the Court noted that "[a] defendant who stands trial is
likely to be presented with choices that entail relinquishment of the
same rights that are relinquished by a defendant who pleads
guilty."' 15 6 These rights include a waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination should the defendant elect to take the witness
stand, a waiver of the right to confront one's accusers should the
defendant decline to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, and
a waiver of the right to trial by jury.' 5 7 Justice Thomas stated that
"while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, it
is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a de-
fendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial."'
158
Therefore, the Court saw no reason to elevate the standard of com-
petency for pleading guilty.
2. The Requisite Competency Standard to Discharge Counsel
Addressing the standard to discharge counsel, Justice Thomas
noted that "there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive
counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning
152 Id. at 2685.
153 Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
O'Connor, and Souter. Justices Kennedy and Scaliajoined as to parts I, II-B, and III of
the Court's opinion and concurred in the judgment.
154 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
155 Id.
156 Id.




than the decision to waive other constitutional rights." 159 Moran
argued that a defendant who represents himself must have greater
powers of reasoning and intelligence than would be necessary for
one who is tried with the aid of counsel.' 60 Justice Thomas coun-
tered by simply noting that the competence required is the compe-
tence to waive the right to counsel, not the technical capacity to
represent oneself.' 61 According to Justice Thomas, a defendant's
"technical legal knowledge" is "not relevant" to whether he is com-
petent to choose self-representation. 62 Therefore, although a de-
fendant would be better able to present a defense with counsel
assisting him than equipped solely with his own untrained legal
skills, the Court did not believe this was adequate reason to elevate
the standard of competency to waive counsel.16 3
3. The Additional Requirement of a "Knowing and Voluntary" Waiver
Justice Thomas then added that, once a trial court determines
that a defendant is competent to waive counsel and plead guilty, the
court must additionally inquire into whether the defendant's waiver
of these rights was indeed "knowing and voluntary."' 164 "In this
sense," according to Justice Thomas, "there is a heightened stan-
dard for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel, but it is
not a heightened standard of competence."'165 Justice Thomas ex-
plained that Westbrook follows this two-part inquiry.' 66 He noted
that when Westbrook "distinguished between 'competence to stand
trial' and 'competence to waive [the] constitutional right to assist-
ance of counsel,' we were using 'competence to waive' as a short-
hand for the 'intelligent and competent waiver' requirement of
Johnson v. Zerbst."'167 Therefore, Justice Thomas made it clear that a
defendant must be competent to waive counsel or plead guilty and
the competent defendant's waiver of these constitutional rights
must be intelligent and voluntary before the court can accept it as
valid. 168
159 Id. These "other constitutional rights" are discussed supra note 157 and accompa-
nying text.
160 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
161 Id. at 2687.
162 Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975)).
163 Id
164 Id. (citing Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523 (1992) (guilty plea); Faretta, 422 U.S.
at 835 (waiver of counsel)).
165 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
166 Id. at 2688.




In conclusion, Justice Thomas stated that, although "psychia-
trists .. .may find it useful to classify the various . . .degrees of
[mental] competence, and while states are free to adopt competency
standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation,
the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional
requirements."1 6
9
B. THE CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Kennedy170 concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment. Justice Kennedy observed that the Court, by comparing
the decisions that must be made by a defendant who stands trial
with those made by a defendant who pleads guilty and waives coun-
sel, "seems to suggest that there may have been a heightened stan-
dard of competency required by the Due Process Clause if the
decisions were not equivalent."17 1 Even if the decisions were not
equivalent, Justice Kennedy would still conclude that due process
does not require a heightened standard of competency.
Justice Kennedy criticized the Ninth Circuit for reading the
Dusky articulation of " 'competency to stand trial' in too narrow a
fashion."' 172 "Although the Dusky standard refer[red] to the 'ability
to consult with [a] lawyer,' "Justice Kennedy noted that the critical
aspect of the Dusky inquiry is whether the defendant possesses "a
reasonable degree of rational understanding."1 73 According to Jus-
tice Kennedy, "the focus of the Dusky formulation is on a particular
level of mental functioning, which the ability to consult with counsel
helps identify."1 74 Whether a defendant actually consults with an
attorney is not necessary "for the standard to serve its purpose."1 75
Justice Kennedy then examined eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury American and English common law. Justice Kennedy found no
precedent for the rule that due process mandates distinct standards
of competency for different decisions during, or at different stages
throughout, criminal proceedings. 176 Justice Kennedy argued that
since Nevada's use of a single standard did not " 'offend[] some
principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental,'" he would not overturn its
169 Id.
170 Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice Scalia. These Justices concurred in the
judgment and joined Parts I, II-B, and III of the Court's opinion.
171 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2688 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
172 Id. at 2689 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
174 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
175 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 2689-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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use. 177
Each case surveyed by Justice Kennedy evaluated the compe-
tency of defendants, who claimed to be insane, to proceed through
the various stages of a trial. According to Justice Kennedy, these
cases either "referred to insanity in a manner that suggested there
was a single standard by which competency was to be assessed
throughout legal proceedings"' 178 or "describe[d] the standard by
which competency is to be measured in a way that supports the idea
that a single standard, parallel to that articulated in Dusky, is applied
no matter what point during legal proceedings a competency ques-
tion should arise."' 179 The concurrence thus determined that the
common law did not "apply different competency standards to dif-
ferent stages of criminal proceedings or to the variety of decisions
that a defendant must make. ' 180
Justice Kennedy then illustrated the difficulties that the applica-
tion of different competency standards might cause during criminal
prosecutions. Initially, a trial court would have difficulty determin-
ing exactly which standard to apply at a given point in the proceed-
ings. 18 Once the appropriate standard is selected, a trial court
would have trouble applying the subtle nuances that distinguish one
standard from another' 82
Lastly, Justice Kennedy noted that "trial courts have the obliga-
tion of conducting a hearing whenever there is sufficient doubt con-
cerning a defendant's competence."'18 3 However, the use of a single
standard throughout the course of a trial to evaluate that compe-
tence does not offend any fundamental principles of justice.'
84
177 Id. at 2689 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 202 (1977).
178 Id. at 2690 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing State v. Reed, 7 So. 132 (La. 1889);
Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1 (1875); Crocker v. State, 19 N.W. 435 (Wis. 1884);
Regina v. Southey, 176 Eng. Rep. 825 (N.P. 1865)).
179 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2690 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Moss v. Hunter, 167
F.2d 683 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 860 (1948); Hunt v. State, 27 So. 2d 186 (Ala.
1946); Commonwealth v. Woelfel 88 S.W. 1061 (Ky. 1905); State v. Seminary, 115 So.
370 (La. 1927); Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 2 (N.Y. 1847); State ex reL Townsend v.
Bushong, 65 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio 1946) (per curiam);Jordan v. State, 135 S.W. 327 (Tenn.
1911)).
180 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2690 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 2691 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
183 Id (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180-81
(1975)).
184 Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Blackmun185 opened by criticizing the practical results
of the majority's opinion. He pointed out that "the majority up-
holds the death sentence for a person whose decision to discharge
counsel, plead guilty, and present no defense well may have been
the product of medication or mental illness."' 18 6 The dissent called
this result "contrary to both common sense and longstanding case
law." 1
87
Justice Blackmun argued that the "standard for competence to
stand trial is specifically designed to measure a defendant's ability to
consult with counsel and to assist in preparing his defense."' 88 Ac-
cording to the dissent, "[t]he reliability or ... relevance of such a
finding vanishes when its basic premise-that counsel will be pres-
ent-ceases to exist."' 8 9 Justice Blackmun disagreed with the ma-
jority's premise that a "defendant who is found competent to stand
trial with the assistance of counsel is, ipso facto, competent to dis-
charge counsel and represent himself."' 190 In Justice Blackmun's
view, competency for one purpose does not imply competency for
another. 19 1 Justice Blackmun opined that competency evaluations
should be "specifically tailored to the context and purpose of a
proceeding." ' 92
Justice Blackmun relied on the earlier precedents of Massey and
Westbrook to support his position. In Massey, the Court stated that
"[o]ne might not be insane in the sense of being incapable of stand-
ing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand trial without the benefit of
counsel."' 193 Similarly, in Westbrook, the Court held that "[a]lthough
petitioner received a hearing on the issue of his competence to
stand trial, there appears to have been no .. . inquiry into the issue
of his competence to waive his constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel and to proceed, as he did, to conduct his own de-
fense." 194 Justice Blackmun cited these cases as evidence that the
185 Justice Blackmun was joined by Justice Stevens.
186 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2692 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 2693 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
189 Id. at 2694 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun illustrated this point with the
analogy that "a person who is competent to play basketball is not thereby competent to
play the violin." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
192 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108
(1954)).




competency standard to waive counsel may be higher than the stan-
dard to stand trial.
Justice Blackmun then analogized the present case to Rees,
which, in his opinion, hints at the "contours" of the competency
standard for self-representation. 95 Justice Blackmun reasoned that
"[c]ertainly the competency required for a capital defendant to pro-
ceed without the advice of counsel at trial or in plea negotiations should
be no less than the competency required for a capital defendant to
proceed against the advice of counsel to withdraw a petition for certio-
rari."' 196 He then noted that the "rational choice" standard in Rees
approximates the Ninth Circuit's "reasoned choice" standard in the
present case.'
97
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for overruling Westbrook
and Massey, sub silentio, by extrapolating from the constitutional right
of self-representation the proposition that "a criminal defendant's
ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to
choose self-representation."' 198 Although a defendant need not have
the experience of an attorney, the Faretta right to self-representation
is available only to those who can choose it "competently and intelli-
gently."1 99 According to Justice Blackmun, "[t]he majority's at-
tempt to extricate the competence to waive the right to counsel
from the competence to represent oneself is unavailing, because the
former decision necessarily entails the latter." 200
Justice Blackmun then demonstrated that Moran's waiver of
counsel and his guilty plea were neither competent nor intelligent.
The dissent noted that the psychiatrist's report showed Moran
suffered from "deep depression" and that Moran's own testimony
showed he was simultaneously taking four prescription medica-
tions.20 1 Based on this evidence, Justice Blackmun believed "the
trial judge should have conducted another competency
examination." 20 2
195 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 2695 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
199 Id- (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835
(1975)).
200 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent illustrated this point with the analogy
that "a defendant who is utterly incapable of conducting his own defense cannot be
considered 'competent' to make such a decision, any more than a person who chooses to
leap out of a window in the belief that he can fly can be considered 'competent' to make
such a choice." Id. at 2695-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 2696 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).




The Godinez Court settled an important constitutional criminal
procedural issue that had confused, confounded, and divided the
federal courts since 1966, the year the Supreme Court issued the
two-paragraph Westbrook v. Arizona 203 decision. 20 4 The Godinez
Court's holding-that due process does not require a heightened
competency standard to waive constitutional rights above the stan-
dard to stand trial-provides a clearer interpretation of Westbrook
than the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sieling v. Eyman 20 5 and is consis-
tent with the elusive and oft-misinterpreted Massey v. Moore20 6 and
Rees v. Peyton20 7 decisions. Godinez also comports both with the pol-
icy considerations supporting a defendant's right to plea bargain
and the right to self-representation implicit in the Sixth
Amendment.
A. THE COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO IMPLY FROM EARLIER
PRECEDENT THAT DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A HIGHER
COMPETENCY STANDARD TO WAIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS THAN THE COMPETENCY STANDARD TO
STAND TRIAL
The Court correctly rejected the Ninth Circuit's Sieling logic,
20 8
which concluded that Westbrook requires an additional inquiry, using
a higher competency standard than Dusky v. United States,20 9 to evalu-
ate a defendant's mental capacity to discharge counsel or enter a
guilty plea. The Ninth Circuit, like the dissent210 and various com-
mentators,21' made much of the fact that the Westbrook Court re-
manded the case for further inquiry into the accused's waiver of the
right to counsel, even though the accused had already received a
hearing regarding his competence to stand trial. The Ninth Circuit
saw this as evidence that a determination of competency to stand
203 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam).
204 One court has described the Westbrook opinion as "cryptic." People v. Matheson,
245 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
205 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973). Because this case gives the same holding as Moran
v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1992), which has been reversed by Godinez v. Moran,
113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993), it too has been overruled by implication.
206 348 U.S. 105 (1954).
207 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam).
208 See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
209 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
210 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
211 See Note, Competence to Plead Guilty and to Stand Trial: A New Standard When a Criminal




trial is inadequate to imply competency to waive constitutional
rights.
Noting its serious protecting duty to ensure that a waiver is "in-
telligent and competent," 21 2 the Westbrook Court remanded to en-
sure that this protecting duty was fulfilled. One might interpret this
remand, as did the Ninth Circuit, as equating competence to waive
with "intelligen[ce] and know[ledge]"; that is, in order for a waiver
of counsel to be intelligent and knowing, there must be a further
inquiry into mental competence beyond the original inquiry into
competence to stand trial. The key to interpreting Westbrook, how-
ever, is to identify the particular issue that the Court remanded for
"further inquiry": "was the defendant competent to waive coun-
sel?" or "did the presumably competent defendant make a valid
waiver in light of the three-prong inquiry of the Johnson v. Zerbst 213
progeny?" That the Westbrook Court remanded the case for the lat-
ter-for inquiry into whether the waiver was valid, rather than for
inquiry into the accused's competence to waive counsel-was effec-
tively illustrated by the Godinez Court. Godinez makes clear that
although Westbrook distinguished "competence to stand trial" from
"competence to waive [the] constitutional right to assistance of
counsel," Westbrook intended to use "competence to waive" as a
shorthand for the "intelligent and knowing" requirement of John-
son.214 Godinez was certain of its Westbrook interpretation since that
opinion quoted the Johnson language "immediately after noting that
the trial court had not determined whether the [defendant] was
competent to waive his right to counsel." 21 5 Thus, as Godinez
reveals, Westbrook involved only the question of the validity of a
waiver and not the issue of a defendant's competency to waive the
right to an attorney.
The Godinez opinion is also consistent with Massey and Rees. The
dissent and at least two academic commentators 216 misinterpret the
statement in Massey that a defendant "might not be insane in the
sense of being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to
stand trial without benefit of counsel." 21 7 Justice Blackmun, in dis-
sent, cited this phrase for the notion that competency for one pur-
pose does not necessarily imply competency for another.21 8 Such
212 Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam) (citingJohnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)).
213 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
214 Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2688 (1993).
215 Id (citing Westbrook, 384 U.S. at 150).
216 See Silten & Tullis, supra note 19, at 1067.
217 Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
218 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2694 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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an interpretation, however, takes Massey out of context. As noted, in
making this statement the Massey Court was not concluding that the
competency standards to waive constitutional rights and to stand
trial are necessarily different as a matter of law; it was merely sug-
gesting that a difference may exist.2 19 Thus, the Massey Court did
not enunciate a legal standard. Rather, it acknowledged that the
question of whether the standards are the same was as yet unsettled.
The Godinez holding resolves this previously undecided issue.
The dissent also incorrectly interprets Rees as requiring a
heightened standard of competency. 220 Although the Rees Court
spoke of a defendant's capacity to make a "rational choice,"
22 '
which the dissent equated to the Ninth Circuit's "reasoned choice"
standard, the Rees Court gave absolutely no indication that it
intended to formulate and utilize a competency standard in this situ-
ation that was higher than the Dusky "rational and factual under-
standing" standard.2 22 One would think that if the Rees Court really
intended to formulate a higher standard of mental competency in
this situation, the Court would have explicitly explained that it was
doing so. In this regard, one would have expected the Rees Court,
as did the Ninth Circuit in Sieling, to state that "reasoned choice"
requires a greater mental capacity than the Dusky "rational and fac-
tual understanding" standard. Godinez aptly describes the similarity
between these terms by stating that "how this ['reasoned choice']
standard is different from (much less higher than) the Dusky stan-
dard ... is not readily apparent to us."
223
It follows that when the Rees Court spoke of determining mental
competence "in the present posture of things, ' 224 the Court meant
"in light of any current factual developments concerning the de-
fendant's mental health," not "in light of a higher competency stan-
dard now that the defendant is trying to forego further appeals as
opposed to merely standing trial." The Rees Court simply could not
determine whether to allow the defendant to withdraw his petition
for certiorari because the district court had not yet had the occasion
to make a judicial determination as to his mental condition "in the
present posture of things." Thus, the Court was merely remanding
the case for a determination of whether the defendant was compe-
tent to withdraw his petition for certiorari, in light of all current fac-
219 See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
220 See Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2694-95 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221 Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (per curiam).
222 The majority acknowledged this point. See Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686 n.9.
223 Id. at 2686.
224 Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966).
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tual developments regarding his mental health, without giving any
direction to the lower court to employ a heightened standard.
B. THE COURT'S OPINION COMPORTS WITH THE POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS
A defendant who pleads guilty waives the Fifth Amendment
prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination. In fact, a defend-
ant who pleads guilty does more than present evidence against him-
self-he consents to the entry of a guilty plea. The trial court or
jury does not need to examine or weigh any evidence; it only has to
enter judgment and declare sentence. 225 Nonetheless, the Court
correctly held that due process does not require a standard of
mental competency to plead guilty that is higher than that standard
of competency required of a defendant before he may be prose-
cuted. Although the entry of a guilty plea is a bold step, the Godinez
Court explained that a defendant who elects to plead not guilty
often is presented with similar choices involving the relinquishment
of other constitutional rights. 226 These rights, delineated in Boykin
v. Alabama,227 include the privilege against compulsory incrimina-
tion, the right to trial by jury and the right to confront one's accus-
ers. 228 The Court concluded, however, that while the decision to
plead guilty is undeniably profound, it is no more complex "than
the sum total of decisions a defendant may be called upon to make
during the course of a trial."'22
9
The Court's logic, solid in and of itself, is in accord with the
policy considerations behind the theory of plea bargaining. Multi-
ple competency standards could conflict with a defendant's right to
plea bargain. A competency standard for pleading guilty that is
higher than the Dusky standard for standing trial would create a class
of semi-competent defendants who are able to stand trial but not to
plead guilty.230 This class would essentially be deprived of the
speed, efficiency and privacy of the plea bargaining process afforded
to other defendants. 23
1
225 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
226 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
227 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
228 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
229 1&
230 See Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978);
United States exreL Heral v. Franzen, 667 F.2d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1981); People v. Heral,
342 N.E.2d 34, 37 (Ill. 1976).




C. THE COURT'S OPINION IS CONSISTENT WITH A DEFENDANT'S SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
The Court correctly held that due process does not require a
standard of mental competency to discharge one's counsel that is
higher than the standard of competency required of a defendant
before he may be put to trial. The Court arrived at this conclusion
by noting that the mental competency needed to choose to waive
counsel is no greater than that needed to waive other constitutional
rights.232 The Court referred to a waiver of the right prohibiting
compulsory self-incrimination, along with those "Boykin rights" that
a defendant waives when he enters a guilty plea. 23 3 Since the Court
had earlier held that the competency required to plead guilty is no
higher than the competency to stand trial, it naturally followed, in
the Court's opinion, that the competency required to waive counsel
need not be any higher either. Although this logic is solid, the
Court could have also approached the issue in terms of the right to
self-representation articulated in Faretta v. California,23 4 with which
the Court's decision is in accord.
In Faretta, the Supreme Court inferred the right to self-repre-
sentation from the structure of the Sixth Amendment. There, the
Court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment speaks of the assist-
ance of counsel and that an attorney is merely the defendant's ancil-
lary assistant in preparing a defense to the charges. 23 5 In this
respect, Faretta heavily emphasized the recognition of a defendant's
personal autonomy in regards to legal proceedings.
Consistent with this perspective, several lower courts have rea-
soned that the decision to represent oneself is not a waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, but an active asser-
tion of the constitutional right to self-representation over the consti-
tutional right to assistance of counsel. 23 6 The decisions a defendant
must make regarding his Sixth Amendment rights-and, accord-
ingly, the level of competence required to engage in that process-
are identical whether the defendant elects to proceed through trial
with counsel, or whether he elects to proceed pro se. One would
naturally view the decision to proceed with counsel as the assertion
232 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
233 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
234 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
235 Id. at 820. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
236 See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 250 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
980 (1987); United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 133-34 (2d Cir.




of one's right to an attorney, rather than a waiver of one's "Faretta
right" to self-representation. Likewise, one could perceive the deci-
sion to appearpro se at court as the assertion of one's Sixth Amend-
ment "Faretta right" to self-representation, rather than a waiver of
one's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. These rights to counsel
and self-representation, though of the same constitutional cali-
ber,23 7 are necessarily mutually exclusive. One logically cannot ex-
ercise the right to counsel and the right to self-representation
simultaneously. 238 Thus, the exercise of one need not be viewed as
a waiver of the other, but instead as a conscious decision to invoke
one constitutional right rather than another. In this respect, it
would make little sense to hold that the assertion of one's "Faretta
right" to self-representation requires a higher mental functioning
than the assertion of one's right to representation of counsel, since
the rights are of an identical constitutional caliber and require iden-
tical decision processes.
People v. Reason 23 9 best illustrates this logic. There, the trial
court determined that the defendant was competent to stand
trial.240 When the trial commenced two years later, the defendant
insisted upon self-representation. Throughout his trial the defend-
ant persistently ignored the court's suggestions that he conduct his
defense with the assistance of the two assigned attorneys and also
rejected the court's recommendation of the insanity defense, choos-
ing instead to present an alibi defense. 241 The trial court allowed
him to continue his own defense, but instructed the appointed attor-
neys to remain at his side throughout the trial.242 At trial, especially
during the opening and closing statements, the defendant "drifted
into irrelevant and nearly incoherent discourses. ' 243 Not surpris-
ingly, upon conclusion, "the jury found the defendant guilty as
charged." 244
On appeal, the defendant's attorney claimed that the defendant
was denied his constitutional right to counsel since he lacked suffi-
cient capacity or competence to act as his own attorney, arguing that
237 Though the right to counsel is expressly incorporated in the Sixth Amendment,
the Supreme Court in Farella has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to incorporate a
constitutional right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819
(1975).
238 In fact, one court identified that the decision to waive counsel is "implicit in the
assertion of the right to defend Pro se." Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574.
239 334 N.E.2d 572 (N.Y. 1975).







the lower court "failed to perceive the distinction between mental
capacity to stand trial and competency to act as attorney Pro se."' 245
In rejecting this contention, the Court of Appeals of New York
noted that it would be "difficult to formulate a workable, and pre-
sumably higher, standard of competency which would not infringe
on the defendant's constitutional right to appear and defend in per-
son." 24 6 Essentially, a higher competency standard would bar that
semi-competent class of defendants from asserting their constitu-
tional "Faretta rights" at trial. By so noting, the Reason court recog-
nized that the right to assistance of counsel and the right to self-
representation are of identical constitutional calibers and that there
is no reason to require a heightened competency standard to assert
one over the other. In conclusion, the court in Reason stated that
after a defendant has been judged competent to stand trial, the only
remaining "competency" determination is whether the discharge of
counsel was made intelligently and voluntarily.2 47
D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S HOLDING FOR FUTURE
DEFENDANTS' COLLATERAL CHALLENGES TO THEIR
COMPETENCY TO HAVE WAIVED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The holding that due process does not require a higher compe-
tency standard to waive constitutional rights than to stand trial does
not signify that a defendant's altered mental condition is irrelevant
to the determination of whether she is competent to represent her-
self, to plead guilty, or to make any procedural decisions involving a
waiver of constitutional rights. Quite the opposite is true. A de-
fendant may still assert two other arguments concerning her mental
condition in collaterally challenging her competency to waive such
rights. First, under Godinez, she may challenge her competency, in
light of her changed mental condition between the time of her
original competency hearing and the time of her decision to waive
counsel, under the Dusky "rational understanding" minimum stan-
dard.2 48 If the state has adopted a higher standard by statute,2 4 9
245 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
246 Id. at 574. Note that Reason is a New York state case and that the Constitution of
the State of New York specifically provides for the right to self-representation. N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6. By contrast, this right is merely implied in the structure of the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
819 (1975).
247 Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 573-74.
248 Moran in fact attempted this, unsuccessfully, during the postconviction hearing.
See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. However, the court may have erred by
rejecting Moran's claim that he was mentally incompetent to represent himself. In de-
termining that Moran was competent to stand trial, the court had originally relied on the
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then the defendant may challenge her allegedly altered mental com-
petency under whatever elaborate formulation the legislature has
devised. Second, if the defendant is found competent to waive these
rights, she may still challenge her waiver under the additional re-
quirement that such waivers be exercised voluntarily and intelli-
gently. Reason demonstrated this point when the court noted that
"the determination that... [the waiver] was intelligent and volun-
tary, and thus legally effective, may well turn, even in major part, on
the mental capability of the defendant at the time in the circum-
stances." 250 The validity of Moran's waiver, in light of the possibil-
ity that his medications caused his lethargy and depression, was not
at issue in Godinez and may be the subject of future appeals. 25' The
Godinez Court indeed hinted at this option when it acknowledged
that in addition to determining whether a defendant was competent
to discharge counsel, the court must satisfy itself that the discharge
was knowing and voluntary.
252
The dissent incorrectly notes that the majority's transformation
of the Westbrook case into a case about the voluntariness of Moran's
waiver "needlessly complicates this area of the law." 253 In fact, the
majority's rejection of the Ninth Circuit's "reasoned choice" stan-
dard eliminates the guesswork in distinguishing between subtle nu-
ances of the various standards, thus simplifying the inquiry. In
addition, voluntariness will always be an issue in any waiver case
under Johnson and Brady.254 In any event, the majority noted, the
states remain free to adopt heightened standards by statute if they
believe that Dusky is inadequate to measure competency to waive
rights. The Court in Godinez held only that due process does not
require them to do so.
testimony of two psychiatrists. Moran then sought to discharge his counsel two and one-
half months after the hearing about his competence to stand trial. The court, conclud-
ing that Moran was competent to discharge his counsel based on the Dusky standard,
relied on these same psychiatric evaluations. Although the court applied the correct
standard, it should have ordered an updated psychiatric evaluation of Moran since his
mental condition may have changed since the earlier examination. This possible error,
however, was not at issue in Godinez.
249 The Godinez Court explained that the states are free to adopt higher competency
requirements, but due process does not compel them to do so. Godinez v. Moran, 113
S. Ct. 2680, 2688 (1993).
250 Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574.
251 The trial court explicitly determined that Moran had "knowingly and intelligently"
waived his right to counsel and had "freely and voluntarily" entered his guilty plea, but
these findings were not disputed in Godinez. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2683.
252 Id at 2687.
253 Id at 2695 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
254 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in Godinez v. Moran255 addressed an important issue
that has divided the federal circuit courts for years. The Godinez
Court correctly held that due process does not require a heightened
competency standard to waive constitutional rights above the Dusky
competency standard to stand trial. This holding is in accord both
with the policy justifications supporting the plea bargaining process
and with the constitutional right to self-representation.
Under Godinez, even if the trial court has already found the de-
fendant competent to stand trial, the defendant's mental condition
remains relevant to a judicial determination of competency to waive
constitutional rights. A defendant who wishes to collaterally chal-
lenge his competency may still do so under the Dusky "rational un-
derstanding" standard, unless the state has adopted a higher
standard by statute, in which case the defendant may assert his chal-
lenge in light of whatever standard the state legislature has adopted.
Additionally, if a defendant is found competent to waive his rights,
he may challenge his waiver under the additional requirement that
the waiver be voluntary, intelligent and knowing.
BRIAN R. BOCH
255 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
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